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The policy changes and structural reforms in transition economies over the past 
two decades have created exogenous variations in institutional development, 
which offers us an ideal natural experiment to analyse the causal effects of 
institutions on bank risk-taking behaviour. This paper examines a wide array of 
institutional reforms in respect of law and legal institutions, banking 
liberalization, and enterprise restructuring in privatization and corporate 
governance. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that banks’ 
financial stability has increased substantially subsequent to the institutional 
reforms. Further analysis suggests that the enhancement of financial stability 
mostly comes from the reduction of asset risk. Moreover, the effects of 
institutional reforms on bank risk are more pronounced for domestic banks than 
foreign banks. From the policy consideration, our study sheds light on the risk 
implications of different institutional reforms that have been characterizing 
transition countries. 
 
Keywords: institutional development, bank risk, transition banking, foreign 
ownership 
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Siirtymätalouksissa viimeisten parin vuosikymmenen aikana toteutettujen ra-
kenneuudistusten ja harjoitetun politiikan linjamuutosten ansiosta näiden maiden 
institutionaalinen kehitys tarjoaa ihanteelliset luonnonmukaiset testiolosuhteet, 
joiden avulla voidaan tutkia instituutioiden kausaalisia vaikutuksia pankkien 
riskinottoon. Tässä työssä institutionaalisia uudistuksia tarkastellaan usean indi-
kaattorin avulla. Nämä indikaattorit liittyvät lainsäädännön ja oikeusjärjestelmän 
muutoksiin, pankkitoiminnan vapauttamiseen, yritystoiminnan rakennejärjestelyi-
hin ja yritysten hallinta- ja valvontajärjestelmien muutoksiin. Tutkimuksessa käy-
tetty estimointimenetelmä soveltuu hyvin erojen tunnistamiseen. Tulosten mukaan 
pankkien taloudellinen vakaus on lisääntynyt merkittävästi tehtyjen institutionaa-
listen uudistusten jälkeen. Lisätarkastelut viittaavat siihen, että pankkien vakaam-
pi talous on ennen kaikkea seurausta pankkien varoihin kohdistuvien riskien pie-
nentymisestä. Institutionaaliset uudistukset vaikuttavat lisäksi voimakkaammin 
kotimaisten kuin ulkomaisten pankkien riskinottoon. Pankkien sääntelyn ja val-
vonnan kannalta tutkimus korostaa erilaisten kehittyvissä talouksissa toteutettujen 
institutionaalisten uudistusten vaikutuksia pankkien riskinottoon. 
 
Avainsanat: institutionaalinen kehitys, pankkien riskit, siirtymäajan pankki-
toiminta, ulkomaalaisomistus 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, P30, P34, P52  
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A growing literature pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Vishny (1998, 
1999) has demonstrated the important connections between legal institutions and 
finance. In particular, this line of research suggests that efficient legal systems and 
stronger investor protections can empower investors to enforce their contracts, 
and therefore better institutions are positively correlated with external financing 
and economic development (Levine, 1998, 1999; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2007; Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig, 2010). A number of more recent papers bring 
these important insights into the examination of firm risk. For example, John, 
Litov, and Yeung (2008) show that strong shareholder protections could 
encourage managers to undertake riskier but value-enhancing projects. Acharya, 
Amihud, and Litov (2009) find that strong creditor rights could lead to risk 
reduction through value-decreasing acquisition. Focusing on banking institutions, 
Laeven and Levine (2009) emphasize the important role of governance structure 
in shaping bank risk. They find that strong shareholder power and cash flow rights 
are associated with greater risk-taking behavior. Importantly, the effects of 
national regulation on bank risk may also depend on the governance structure of 
the banks. Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma (2010) investigate the links between creditor 
rights and bank risk. Their findings further suggest that a stronger credit right 
environment also induces banks taking more risk. 
  Noticeably, these studies are mainly focused on market economies, where 
institutional development began long time ago and the quality of the institutions 
has hardly changed over the recent years. Little attention by far has been paid to 
institutional reforms, especially how substantial changes in institutional 
environment could get transmitted to the banking sectors and influence bank risk-
taking behavior. The limited research is somewhat surprising given that many 
developing countries have undertaken considerable institutional reforms over the 
last two decades. Moreover, since banking soundness is vital to economic stability 
and long-term growth (Allen and Gale, 2004; Levine, 2005), it is essential to 
examine the risk implications of institution reforms from a policy perspective. We 
therefore attempt to fill this gap. 
  In this paper, we propose a natural experiment to empirically analyze the 
causal effects of institutional reforms on banks’ risk-taking behavior. The 
experiment exploits the considerable variations in the timing and depth of 
institutional reforms in the Eastern European transition economies caused by their 
transition processes from socialist central planning to market-oriented systems. 
We believe this to be an ideal natural experiment for the following reasons. First, 
their social and economic background offers us the unique opportunity to observe 
institutional development from the initial situation when market-oriented 
institutions were totally absent. We therefore can have a clean natural experiment  
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to test how substantial changes of institutional set-up affect bank risk. Second, 
policy changes and institutional reforms are exogenous shocks to the institutional 
development. This allows us to overcome the endogenous nature of institutional 
variables and explore the causal relationships between institutions and bank risk. 
Third, as suggested by Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010), transition countries are 
a fairly homogeneous group in terms of economic conditions and social 
background; there is considerable inter-temporal variation in the timing and depth 
of institutional reforms; and they are all bank-based economies. These features 
make them an excellent sample to study how institutional changes affect bank 
risk. 
  We assemble a dataset comprising various individual bank characteristics and 
time series information of institutional reforms for 15 Eastern European transition 
countries during 1997 to 2008. To explore in detail the channels through which 
institutional changes impact bank risk, we examine different types of reforms in 
law and legal institutions, banking sectors, as well as enterprise sectors. Using a 
difference-in-difference methodology (DID hereafter), we find strong evidence 
that individual banks’ financial stability increase dramatically subsequent to the 
institutional reforms. Notably, 1% improvement of legal reforms could lead to 
1.3% increase in bank stability (measured by Z-score). This finding suggests that 
the establishment a well-functioning legal system is greatly needed in transition 
economies to produce a stable banking sector. Our examination on banking 
liberalization also obtains striking result. In particular, an improvement of banking 
reforms by 1% could lead to an increase in bank stability by 2.2%. Notice that the 
major projects of banking reforms include decentralizing central banks’ 
commercial banking activities, privatizing state banks, liberalizing credit 
allocation, and establishing prudential regulation and supervision. Hence, our 
finding supports the bright side of banking deregulation, which argues that banks 
could better explore economies of scope and scale and thereby create more stable 
revenue (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000). Restrictive regulations, on the other 
hand, may undermine bank stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001; 2004; 
Gonzalez, 2005). The third type of institutional reform is enterprise restructuring, 
which primarily consists of the privatization of state-owned firms and the 
implementation of modern corporate governance. Our finding shows that 
enterprise reform has the largest impact on bank risk, that is, 1% improvement of 
enterprise reform is associated with 5.5% increases of bank stability. This result 
highlights the key role of privatization and corporate governance in reducing risk 
of financial sector. Lastly, to explore fully the role of institutional reforms on 
different types of banks, we investigate the impact of institutional reforms on 
foreign banks versus domestic banks. Our findings suggest that the improvement 
of institutional environment seems benefit domestic banks more than foreign 
banks. We consider various bank characteristics, country characteristics, and a 
variety of measures of bank risk. These conclusions are extremely robust.  
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  This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, we add 
to the law and finance literature by demonstrating the significant effects of 
institutional reforms on bank risk. Institutional reforms are critical steps that 
influence the entire course of institutional development. However, little attention 
has been paid to such extraordinary events and their impacts on the risk-taking 
behavior of firms. We believe that a thorough and good understanding of this 
issue could provide new insights on the dynamics of how institutions affect bank 
risk, eg how substantial changes in institutional settings could get transmitted to 
the banking sectors and affect banks’ risk-taking behavior.  In our paper, we show 
that, far from having a neutral effect, institutional reforms in respect of legal, 
banking, and enterprise sector all have a profound influence on the bank risk. 
Subsequent to the improvement of the institutional environment, bank financial 
stability increases substantially. Secondly, the institutional variables used in the 
prior studies have largely suffered from the fact that they hardly change over time, 
and because of that, many studies rely on a cross-country set-up to capture the 
differences in legal institutions. However, this approach may cause the omitted 
variable problem because many country characteristics are unobservable. Our 
research design exploits the exogenous variations of institutional development. 
Using a DID approach, we derive a direct and clean test on the causal nexus 
between institutions and bank risk-taking behavior. Thirdly, our research 
contributes to the transition banking literature. Although there have been 
extensive studies examining the performance of banks in transition economies (eg 
Weill, 2003; Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005a, 2005b, 2009), knowledge is still 
scant with regards to their risk-taking behavior and how the institutional 
environment influences it. A notable exception is Haselmann and Wachtel (2007), 
who analyze the risk management activities of banks during transition process. 
However, their results indicate that there are no significant connections between 
risk taking and the quality of legal institution, though capital ratio is found to be 
higher in unsound legal environment. Our paper takes a more comprehensive 
approach to understand various channels through which institutional environment 
could influence the risky behavior of banks. Instead of examining law and legal 
institutions only, we also investigate institutional development in the banking 
sector as well as enterprise sector. In this respect, our findings complement 
previous work that tells us how law affects bank lending in transition economies 
(Pistor, 2000; Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000; Haselmann and Wachtel, 2010; 
Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig, 2010; Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2010). 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce 
various institutional reforms, review the relevant literature, and then propose our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and methodology. Section 4 
presents the analysis of the empirical results, and Section 5 discusses policy 
implications and concludes. 
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2  Institutional reforms in transition economies and 
bank risk 
2.1 Banking  liberalization 
The banking sectors of transition economies have progressed remarkably in the 
past twenty years. Under a centrally planned economy, commercial banks only 
served one industry and their lending activities were entirely decided by the 
central banks based on the government budget plans. Banks therefore faced no 
pressure of competition and had little incentive to monitor firms. This situation 
has changed dramatically since banking reforms started. To make the 
transformation from socialist to market-oriented banking sectors, governments 
implemented numerous policies to liberalize interest rates and decentralize central 
banks’ commercial banking activities to state banks. To foster a competitive 
banking industry, many originally state-owned banks were privatized into private 
hands with a large involvement of foreign banks. In the recent years, greater 
efforts have been given to the establishment of prudential regulation and 
supervision guidelines. Significant progress towards the implementation of the 
core principles of Basle Committee has been made. 
  In the literature, the relation between bank regulation and risk taking is 
ambiguous. Under the traditional view, bank deregulation is likely to foster a 
competitive market and the increased competition would further encourage 
greater bank risk-taking and induce intensified moral hazard problem (Keeley, 
1990; Grossman, 1992; Galloway, Lee, and Roden, 1997; Boyd, Chang, and 
Smith, 1998). Consistent with these findings, Dick finds higher loan loss 
provisions following the Riegle-Neal Act deregulation in the 1990s in US (Dick, 
2006). An alternative argument by Claessens and Klingebiel (2000), however, 
says that if banks are given greater freedom, they could have more ability to 
pursue economies of scale and scope and diversify income flows. Recent studies 
by Barth, Capiro, and Levine (2001, 2004) and Laeven and Levine (2009) provide 
supporting evidence to this view that countries with restrictive regulations on 
securities underwriting, brokering, and mutual fund business tend to have more 
fragile financial systems. Similarly, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) and 
Gonzalez (2005) show that regulatory restrictions reduce banks’ charter value and 
consequently increase their incentive to take on risky projects. 
  Prior studies on regulation and risk taking are primarily focused on market-
oriented countries and many transition economies are left out of the sample. A 
recent paper by Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou (2008) analyzes the effect of 
banking reforms on efficiency. They show that banking reforms, through 
increased competition and greater risk taking, lead to an increase in banking  
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efficiency. Bank risk in their paper is considered as a determinant of efficiency 
performance. In our paper, we directly test the impact of banking reforms on bank 
risk. Drawing on prior studies, if the competition effect resulted from banking 
liberalization dominates the banking market, we would expect to find that banks 
might take more risky projects in order to compete with others. Moreover, 
intensified moral hazard problem might further undermine the financial stability 
of the banking sector. These considerations would translate into an increased level 
of bank risk subsequent to banking reforms. On the other hand, if deregulation of 
bank activities actually gives banks more freedom to pursue economies of scope 
and scale, one would find bank risk to decrease. In addition, with the involvement 
of experienced foreign banks, risk management skills may also spills over to the 
other banks in the market. These arguments, then, would lead to a positive 
relationship between banking liberalization and bank stability. 
 
 
2.2 Enterprise  reforms 
State ownership and weak corporate control have been main factors explaining the 
poor performance of enterprises in transition economies (Kornai, 1992; Stiglitz, 
1999). The concept of financial discipline and accountability was absent from 
socialist firms. Enterprises did not have to worry about raising external finance as 
government provided what they needed based on the budget plans. At the early 
stage of the transition process, firms tended to follow the old socialist style and 
had little incentive to repay their debt (Perotti, 1993). And the problem of bad 
loans still persisted in many banks in transition economies (Kager, 2002). To 
promote corporate governance effectively, governments in transition economies 
have implemented numerous reforms in recent years. These reforms include the 
privatization of state-owned firms, tighter credit and subsidy policies vis-à-vis 
enterprises, the enforcement of bankruptcy legislation, actions that foster 
competition and market discipline, the strengthening of financial discipline, and 
the hardening of budget constraints. The ultimate goal of these reforms is to foster 
market-driven restructuring and improve corporate control via financial 
institutions and markets. 
  It is very intuitive that the fragility of the banking sector is closely related to 
the performance of enterprise sector, as corporate loans constitute a large 
proportion of banks’ income. In transition countries, this connection should be 
more pronounced given that non-performing loans have been at the root of the 
commercial banks’ trouble since the central planning economy (Perotti, 1993). 
Pistor (2000) argues that a good corporate governance structure could give a firm 
easier access to capital, as investors are less hesitant to lend money or buy shares 
in a corporation that subscribes to good corporate governance principles. When  
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substantial corporate governance reforms have not been taken and the newly 
emerged private ownership structure does not match investor protection, firms 
would suffer from external financing. Banks, as major credit providers to 
enterprises, might either hesitate to lend or not be able to retrieve their money, 
suffering from large income volatility. Therefore, we expect that a higher level of 
progress in enterprise reforms is associated with enhanced bank stability. 
 
 
2.3 Legal  reforms 
In the early stage of transition, legal systems of transition countries were all well 
below the world average (Pistor, 2000). In the absence of the sanction of financial 
discipline and creditor rights, banks hesitated to lend money to a firm (Pistor, 
Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000).  In order to create an investor-friendly, transparent and 
predictable legal environment, governments in transition economies initiate 
projects modifying laws and improving the efficiency of judicial systems. The 
legal reforms were driven by the desire to attract foreign investment during the 
early stage of transition (EBRD 1995, 1996). In the later years, the main objective 
was to catch up with international standards and to create a functional legal 
regime for an insolvency legal regime in a given practical situation (EBRD, 2003; 
2004). 
  The law and finance literature has long recognized the importance of legal 
system in promoting the overall level of financing (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Vishny, 1998; 1999; Levine, 1998; 1999; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2007; Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig, 2010). The suggested mechanism through 
which stronger creditor rights enhance lending volume is by empowering lenders 
to secure their loans and enforce their rights in bankruptcy procedures and 
collateral recovery. According to this rationale, we might expect that, all else 
equal, banks should be more likely to grab collateral, force repayment, and control 
the insolvent debtors in a stronger legal environment. This would lead to higher 
financial stability. Moreover, if banks are granted higher power, they could put on 
more restrictions and play a better role in monitoring firms. Clearly, this would 
also help reduce borrowers’ default risk and enhance bank financial stability. 
However, an alternative hypothesis could be that stronger legal protection could 
foster the confidence of banks to lend to risky enterprises with poorer credit 
ratings. Supporting this point of view, Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma (2010) find that 
stronger creditor rights are correlated with higher bank risk taking. Moreover, the 




3  Data and methodology 
3.1  Bank variables and country-level macro controls 
Our sample consists of 434 banks in fifteen Eastern European countries (Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia) over the period from 1997 to 2008. Bank level accounting 
information is obtained from the BankScope database of Bureau van Dijk. It is a 
widely used database in banking studies, but the preliminary data for transition 
countries require careful editing (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005a). We make a 
careful examination of multiple entries for the same bank because they are not 
completely duplicated observations. First of all, we choose the unconsolidated 
financial reports of commercial banks since this gives the financial data for the 
bank rather than the holding company. Then we check the accounting standards. 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) data are used wherever available; 
otherwise, inflation-adjusted local accounting standards data are used. All 
accounting variables are inflation adjusted and reported in thousand USD. 
  The data for bank ownership is also drawn from BankScope. Since banks of 
transition countries changed ownership several times over the past two decades, it 
is important to have yearly ownership data so that all the ownership changes in 
our sample period are identified (Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). A limitation of 
BankScope is, however, that it only provides shareholder information for the year 
when the database was last updated. Therefore, we take separate editions of the 
database (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007) and fill in the years in between with 
the previous year if data are available. We also go back to 1997 using the same 
ownership as 1999. To achieve higher accuracy we search manually bank 
homepages and business publications as a double check. Through this process we 
identify shareholder information for 305 banks. We group shareholders into two 
categories: foreign and domestic based on the aggregated shares held by each 
group. If foreign shares are majority then the bank is defined as a foreign bank, 
otherwise it is a domestic bank. 
  As for country-level variables, we collect per capital GDP and inflation from 
the 2010 World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). In addition, we 
gather information on deposit insurance coverage of individual countries from the 
database developed by Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2007). Deposit 
insurance is defined as a dummy variable, indicating if a country has explicit 
deposit insurance at a given year. We also obtain banking crisis information for 
individual countries from a dataset complied by Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
Banking crisis is a dummy variable that takes one the value one if the country is 
going through a systemic crisis in a given year, and zero if it is not.  
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3.2  Measuring institutional reforms 
We examine three categories of institutional reforms, namely banking reforms, 
enterprise restructuring, and legal reforms. Indicators for the first two reforms are 
obtained from the transition reports produced by European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD hereafter). EBRD research group have 
tracked the transition progress in different sectors of the former socialist countries. 
For each sector, EBRD have constructed indicators to proxy the year-end status of 
various reforms. For example, the construction of the indicator for banking 
reforms considers the degree of liberalization of interest rates, the allocation of 
bank credit, whether there is significant lending to private enterprises, whether 
there is a significant presence of private banks, and whether bank supervision and 
regulation are prudential. The indicator goes from 1 to 4.3 with higher numbers 
indicating higher stages of development (EBRD, 2007). To evaluate the progress 
of enterprise reforms, EBRD provides three indicators, namely small-scale 
privatization, large-scale privatization, and enterprise restructuring in corporate 
governance. Small-scale privatization is focused on small companies, while large-
scale privatization is focused on large enterprises’ privatization process. The 
indicator of enterprise restructuring in corporate governance evaluates whether 
there are sufficient corporate laws to promote modern governance mechanism. 
The three indices all have a value ranging from 1 to 4.3, with a higher value 
meaning significant improvement. We add them up and calculate the average 
value of the three indices to proxy for the overall progress of institutional reforms 
in the enterprise sector. The higher the index is, the more significant improvement 
in privatization and more effective corporate control exercised through domestic 
financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring. 
  Regarding legal reforms, we borrow the creditor right indicator provided by 
Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000) and Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010). Their 
creditor right indicator evaluates the progress of legal reforms in two main 
regimes: individual enforcement regimes (collateral laws) and collective 
enforcement regimes (bankruptcy laws). The collateral laws specify the type and 
scope of security interests a lender may pledge from a borrower, eg whether 
mortgage land or personal assets can be used as collateral. Bankruptcy laws are 
provisions to ensure an orderly procedure for conflicting claims so that creditors 
can control the liquidation process and avoid a wasteful run on the assets of the 
firm. The detailed construction of the credit right indictor can be found in their 
paper. 
  Table 1 provides a summary statistics of three institutional reforms of 




3.3 Measuring  bank  risk 
Our primary measure is the Z-score, a widely used indicator of financial stability 
in the recent studies (eg Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma, 
2010). Specifically, Z-score  =  (ROA+E/A)/σ(ROA), where ROA and E/A are 
return on asset and capital to asset ratio calculated as the mean over three years 
(present year and the past two years), and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of 
return on asset, calculated over the same time window. Intuitively, Z-score can be 
considered as an inverse measure of insolvency risk, that is, the threat for a bank 
to be forced out of business because of a lack in capital to compensate for a 
decline in the value of its’ assets (E/A < –ROA) (Roy, 1952). A higher Z-score 
implies a lower probability of insolvency and a greater financial stability. Since 
the Z-score is highly skewed, we follow Laeven and Levine (2009) and use the 
natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is normally distributed. In addition, given 
the asset booms that occurred in many of the transition countries, it is interesting 
to split Z-score into two parts: σ(ROA) as a proxy for asset risk and capital ratio 
(E/A) as a proxy for leverage. The decomposition of Z-score could help us gain a 
thorough understanding whether the decrease in overall risk comes from a 
decrease in asset risk or an increase in capital ratio. 
  It is worth noting that Z-score, σ(ROA), and capital ratio only represent 
achieved financial stability but reflect little about how individual banks perform in 
attaining their highest potential level. Put differently, two banks may have the 
same Z-score but one chooses a production plan that optimizes the risk-return 
tradeoff so that the bank can achieve the highest potential stability, while the other 
chooses to produce too many risky projects (eg securities) and get exposed to high 
risk. In the second case, the production plan does not maximize financial stability 
and the bank might have obtained a higher level of financial stability if it 
distributed its resources among risky and less risky assets more efficiently. This 
example shows that some measure that can gauge the deviation of individual 
banks’ the actual stability from their highest potential might be useful to 
complement Z-score. In the banking literature, the concept of X-efficiency has 
been widely used to evaluate how banks perform compared with the ‘best-
practice’ bank in terms of cost minimization or profit maximization (Leibenstein, 
1966). If we think stability as a risk-adjusted performance measure, we can use 
the similar approach to estimate the X-efficiency of stability. We name it as 
‘stability efficiency’ and take as our third measure of bank risk. 
  To empirically estimate stability efficiency, we employ a stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA) to fit an upper envelope of financial stability, proxied by Z-score. 
The difference between the envelope value and actual Z-score represents a bank’s 
deviation from its potential highest stability, thereby providing information on 
banks’ stability efficiency. One difficulty here is to find a functional form for Z- 
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score. We consider Z-score as a risk-adjusted profit, and use the nonstandard 
profit function  to fit Z-score frontier. The model is specified as follows 
 
ν + μ +
+ + + τ +
η + γ + γ + θ +
δ + δ +










lation inf growth GDP dummies year ) w / w ln( z ln
2
1






z ln ) w / w ln( y ln
2
1
) w / w ln( ) w / w ln(
2
1
) w / w ln(










































where y represents two output variable (y1: total loans and y2: other earning 
assets), x w represents three input prices (w1: price of borrowed funds, w2: fixed 
capital, and w3: price of labor), z is equity capital. The normalization by the last 
input price (w3) ensures price homogeneity. In the estimation, we include year 
dummies to control for year fixed effect and country macroeconomic variables to 
reduce heterogeneity. The term ln ν is a random noise and ln µ represents the 
inefficiency of formulating a production plan to obtain the optimal financial 
stability. The advantage of SFA approach is that it can disentangle the 
inefficiency component (ln  µ) from the random noise with certain distribution 
assumption (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 
1977). Here we assume the inefficiency component follows half-normal 
distribution because no banks operate beyond the optimal stability. 
  Our measure of stability efficiency overcomes the disadvantage of cost and 
profit efficiency, as they do not take into account risk factors (Hughes and Moon, 
1995; Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon, 1996; Hughes, 1999; Hughes, Mester, 
and Moon, 2000, 2001). However, we acknowledge that using profit function to 
fit Z-score might not fully represent bank objective function of risk-return 
tradeoff, to the extent that it ignores some important determinants that may 
influence banks’ risk-return trade off, eg managerial risk preference, market 
competition, and regulatory environment. These omitted variables, therefore, are 
likely to left in the inefficiency component estimated from Z-score frontier. 
Taking into account that the aim of this paper is to investigate the financial 
stability of banking sectors and relates it to the changes in the institutional 
environment, we control various potential factors in the regression analysis to 




3.4 Summary  statistics 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the key variables. The observations are 
at the bank-year level. As we can see, the average Z-score across all banks is 
about 46, indicating that on average, profits (ROA) have to fall by 46 times their 
standard deviation to deplete bank equity. Our estimates of stability efficiency 
show that the average level of the financial stability only reaches 47.5% of the 
best performers on the frontier. Examining bank-level financial characteristics, the 
mean (median) ROA is 0.01 (0.01) and the mean (median) σ(ROA) is 0.009 
(0.004). Both numbers are lower than what have been reported in the developed 
countries and major emerging markets (Houston, Li, Li, and Ma, 2010). The mean 
bank size is 1800.781 million; equity to asset ratio (capital ratio) is 13.1%; loan 
ratio is 52%; and deposit ratio is 76.3%. All the financial variables in our sample 
are comparable with prior studies on transition banks (eg Bonin, Hasan, and 
Wachtel, 2005a, 2005b). Regarding country macro controls, we use per capita 
GDP (reported in $000) to control for economic development, and inflation 
(reported in percentage) to control for economic stability. We also include deposit 
insurance coverage and banking crisis. In our sample, 96.2% country-year 
observations have explicit deposit insurance and 9.4% observations are going 
through banking crisis. Detailed variable definition can be found in Appendix A. 
The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows more their correlation matrix. 
 
 
4 Empirical  analysis 
4.1 Difference-in-difference  approach  (DID) 
We examine the effects of institutional reforms on bank risk by employing a 
differences-in-differences methodology. The approach basically compares the 
effects of policy changes on two kinds of groups (treatment- and control group) 
both pre-intervention and post-intervention periods. By subtracting the average 
gains in the control group from the average gains in the treatment group, it 
removes permanent differences between two groups, both observable and 
unobservable, which potentially impact the outcome variable in the post-
intervention period, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment 
group that could be the result of time trends (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
Thus a DID approach is desirable in order to properly control for ‘other’ changes 
that could affect the treated group, other than the policy of interest. 
  In our sample, we have 434 banks in 15 transition countries that experienced 
institutional reforms at different points of time. With multiple groups and time  
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periods, we apply a general framework of DID introduced by Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004). The equation at the individual bank level is as follows 
 
Bank riski,t = αi + αt + δ⋅Reformj,t–1 + γ⋅Xj,t–1 + εi (4.1) 
 
where i indexes individual banks, j indexes countries, and t indexes years. The 
model has a full set of time effects (denoted by αt), a full set of bank effects 
(denoted by αi), group/time period covariates (denoted by Reformsj,t–1), 
individual-specific controls (denoted by Xit), and individual-specific errors, εit. 
The dependent variable is individual bank’s riskiness at year t. Xit includes 
various bank-specific and country macro controls. We are interested in estimating 
δ. Since our institutional reforms are continuous policy variables measuring the 
extent of progress in institutional reforms, δ captures the sensitivity of bank risk to 
the change of institutional reforms. It is also notable that following Haselmann, 
Pistor, and Vig (2010), we use one-year lag values of the reform variables 
considering that the reform indicators represent year-end status. Results are robust 
if we use the current year reform variables. As suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004), we use bootstrapped robust clustered standard errors to 
control for unobserved serial correlations. 
 
 
4.2 Baseline  results:  institutional reforms and bank risk 
We examine the impacts of institutional reforms on bank stability, measured by 
the logarithm of Z-score. The key testing variables are indicators of legal reforms, 
banking reforms and enterprise reforms. We take the logarithm of these indicators 
in order to see the percentage change in bank risk given a percentage change of 
institutional reforms. As specified in equation (4.1), our estimation model 
includes various bank-specific characteristics such as assets, capital ratio (equity 
to asset ratio), loan to asset ratio, deposit to asset ratio, and loan loss provision 
ratio of the previous year. Since it is a cross-country estimation, we also include 
some country-level macro variables including inflation, GDP per capital, indicator 
of deposit insurance, and indicator of banking crisis. Inflation is to control 
macroeconomic stability, and GDP per capita can capture income level and 
economic development of a country. Deposit insurance is used to proxy for 
market discipline, which has been argued to influence bank stability (Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth, Capiro, and Levine, 2006). Similarly, banking 
crisis may also exert strong impact on the stability of banking sectors. We include 
the indicator of banking crisis to control for these events. The detailed definitions 
of these variables can be found in Appendix A.  Our regression results are 
reported in Table 4.  
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  As can be seen in Table 4, we consistently find that all reform indicators are 
positively and statistically significantly associated with Z-score. Since a higher Z–
score implies more stability and less risk taking, our results in general suggest that 
better progress of institutional reforms lead to enhanced stability and reduced 
bank risk taking behavior. Elaborating in detail of each type of institutional 
reforms, the coefficient of legal reforms on Z-score is 1.3366, which means that 
1% improvement of legal reforms translate into to 1.3% increase in Z-score. As 
explained in Section 2, stronger creditor rights may empower banks to secure their 
loans and enforce their rights in bankruptcy procedures and collateral recovery. 
Moreover, creditor rights also allow banks to put on more restrictions and play a 
better role in monitoring firms. Therefore, all else equal, banks operating in a 
better legal environment enjoy higher financial stability. Our finding is consistent 
with these arguments. From the policy perspective, it implies that the 
establishment a well-functioning legal system is greatly needed in transition 
economies to produce a stable banking sector. Our examination on banking 
liberalization also obtains striking result.  The coefficient of banking reform 
indicator on Z-score is 2.1957, suggesting that an improvement of banking 
reforms by 1% could lead to an increase in bank stability by 2.1957%. This effect 
is statistically significant at one percent level and economically meaningful. This 
finding lends supportive evidence to a group of researchers who argue that less 
activity restrictions give banks more freedom to explore economies of scope and 
scale and thereby create more stable revenue (eg Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000; 
Barth, Capiro, and Levine, 2001; 2004; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Enterprise 
reform indicator measures the progress in two regimes, namely privatization of 
state-owned firms and implementation of modern corporate governance. As 
shown in Column (3), enterprise reform indicator is positively related with bank 
stability, measured by Z-score. Moreover, it has the largest economic significance 
among all institutional reforms. The coefficient of enterprise reform indicator on 
Z-score is 5.5268%, meaning that 1% improvement of enterprise reform is 
associated with 5.5% increases of bank stability. This result highlights the key 
role of privatization and corporate governance in reducing risk of financial sector. 
  Ideally, we want to enter three types of institutional reforms at the same time 
to see if their impacts on bank risk hold after controlling each other. However, one 
difficulty in including multiple institutional reforms in the same regression is that 
some of them are highly correlated. We therefore use the residuals from 
regressing each indicator on the other two as orthogonal measures of these 
institutional reforms. Column (4) in Table 4 reports the estimation results of 
regressing three residual measures of reform indicators on bank risk. As can be 
seen, all measures are positively related with Z-score and the coefficients are all at 
one percent statistical level. 
  Besides the main testing variables of institutional reforms, we generally find 
results consistent with existing literature. As might be expected, banks with larger  
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size and higher capital ratio enjoy higher stability. But loan loss provision of the 
previous year, which proxies for the credit risk ex ante, is negatively related to Z-
score. We also include loan to asset ratio and deposit to asset ratio to control 
liquidity level, but do not find them to significantly affect Z-score. Examining the 
country-level macro controls, our results show that having an explicit deposit 
insurance policy significantly decreases bank stability. This is consistent with 
previous studies, which argue that deposit insurance diminishes market discipline 
and intensifies moral hazard problem in banking (eg Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002; Barth, Capiro, and Levine, 2006). 
 
 
4.3 Alternative  measures  of  bank risk and disaggregation 
of the Z-score 
In this subsection, we continue by running specification (4.1) using alternative 
measures of bank risk. First, we decompose Z-score into σ(ROA) and capital ratio 
as two separate measures of bank risk. Based on the calculation of Z-score, we 
know that all else equal, both lower σ(ROA) and higher capital ratio would 
translate into higher Z-score. Since in the previous estimation we have found Z-
score increases subsequent to the institutional reforms, disaggregation of the Z-
score could help us better understand whether the increase of overall bank 
stability is coming from the reduction of asset risk or increase of equity capital. 
Given the increasing lending activities in transition economies, it is interesting to 
see how institutional reforms affect asset risk and equity risk differently. Table 5 
reports the estimation results. 
  We see that all three institutional reforms have a significant and negative 
coefficient associated with σ(ROA), which tells us that the improvement of 
institutional environment leads to a lower level of asset risk. When we enter three 
reforms in the same regression, results become even stronger. These findings 
suggest that the increase of overall bank stability is attributable to the reduction of 
asset risk. We then examine how capital ratio is influenced by the improvement of 
institutional reforms. Interestingly, we find capital ratio is not influenced by 
institutional reforms. The coefficients all have a positive sign, but are not 
statistically significant. We therefore conclude that the increase of overall bank 
stability is primarily driven by a reduction in σ(ROA). 
  In the last four columns, we use the stability efficiency as another measure of 
bank risk. This new measure evaluates the ability of individual banks in 
formulating a production plan and attaining their highest potential stability. As we 
explained in the methodology part, even though two banks have the same Z-score 
and ROA volatility, it is possible that one is operating close to its maximum 
stability while the other is not due to exogenous elements such as managerial  
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inefficiency and environment. Taking into account that the aim of this paper is to 
investigate bank stability and relates it to the changes in the institutional 
environment, we acknowledge that stability efficiency may also reflect some other 
factors such as managerial efficiency. However, we try to mitigate this problem 
by controlling various bank-specific variables. As shown in the results, the 
coefficients are positive and significant, which suggest that institutional reforms 
exert positive impacts on banks to achieve stability efficiency. These results are 
consistent with our findings for Z-score. 
 
 
4.4  Simultaneous estimation of bank risk and profitability 
We are concerned that institutional reforms could influence bank risk-taking by 
affecting their profitability. If banks that are less risky are the ones that are losing 
money, then there might be no direct causal effect of institutional reforms on bank 
risk. Such a ‘spurious’ relationship may bias our results. To address this issue, we 
employ a simultaneous equation system to control for the potential linkage 
between institutional reforms and bank profitability. Following Acharya, Hasan, 
and Saunders (2006), we estimate using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), a 
model developed by Arnold Zellner and first published in Zellner (1962). 
Specifically, in the simultaneous equations system, we use Z-score to measure 
bank risk and ROA to proxy for their profitability. Z-score is modeled exactly as 
in the equation (4.1). ROA is also modeled as the same function of institutional 
reforms and numerous bank- and country level control variables used in the risk 
equation. Bank fixed effect and year fixed effect are included. The results are 
reported in Table 6. 
  As shown in Table 7, three reform indicators all a have positive and 
significant impact on Z-score, which indicates that the effects of institutional 
reforms on bank risk are robust after simultaneously controlling for ROA in the 
same equation system. Examining their coefficients on ROA, we further find that 
banking reforms and enterprise reforms only affect Z-score but not ROA, as the 
coefficients on ROA are not statistically significant. Only legal reform shows a 
significant association with ROA, implying that the improvement of legal 
institutions negatively affects profitability but positively affects bank stability. 
Overall, the simultaneous estimations do not change the results reported in the 
OLS models. Our findings are quite strong and consistent in all the robustness 
tests. Better progress in legal reforms, banking reforms, and enterprise reforms 




4.5  Further test: foreign versus domestic banks 
By this point, we have shown that banks on average enhance financial stability 
subsequent to the improvement of institutional development. In this subsection, 
we further examine whether domestic banks and foreign banks benefit in different 
ways. To test this, we divide our sample into domestic banks and foreign banks 
and re-estimate equation (4.1) for each sample separately. Table 8 reports our 
results. 
  As shown in Panel A, we find that domestic banks enhance financial stability 
significantly subsequent to all three institutional reforms. The influence of 
banking reforms and enterprise reforms is as strong as for the overall sample 
estimation, though the impact of legal reform has a much smaller magnitude. 
These results tell us that domestic banks do enjoy the benefit of risk reduction 
from the improvement of institutional development in transition economies. 
Specifically, better financial discipline on the enterprise sector and strengthened 
regulatory and legal environment may increase domestic banks’ loan recovery rate 
and reduce their risk taking incentive. Examining Panel B, we do not find 
significant association between institutional reforms and bank risk for foreign 
banks, except for legal reforms, which decrease return volatility and increase 
capital ratio. This result is somewhat surprising. However, we believe that it is 
due to the neutralization of two effects. On one hand, foreign banks could enjoy 
lower risk because better institutional environment reduces information 
asymmetry and promotes an investor-friendly and efficient market (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000; Buck, 2003). On the other hand, strengthened regulatory 
environment may also foster foreign banks’ confidence to take on riskier projects, 
which then would cause lower loan recovery rate and higher insolvency risk. This 
conjecture is consistent with some research which has shown that foreign banks 
tend to lend more and charge lower interest rate to firms in countries with better 




The transition process from central economic planning toward market-oriented 
economies is one of the most extraordinary events in the global economy. 
Existing law and finance literature has been mainly focused on mature economies, 
where institutional development began long time ago and the quality of the 
institutions has hardly changed over the past decades. Largely absent from the 
literature is the examination of institutional reforms and how changes in 
institutional settings affect the risk-taking behavior of banks. This paper attempts  
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to further the scholarship in this area by examining different types of institutional 
reforms and their impacts on bank risk in transition economies. 
  Our findings have several broad implications. By exploiting exogenous 
variation in various institutional reforms, we demonstrate their causal effects on 
bank risk. Specifically, banking reforms such as liberalizing interest rates, 
decentralizing central banks’ roles, and deregulating bank activities, have a 
positive impact on the financial stability of the banking sector. Enterprise 
restructuring of privatization and corporate governance also greatly enhances the 
financial stability of banks. With regard to legal reforms, in light with prior 
research that generally finds legal protection to facilitate the credit supplied in the 
economy, the results of our article show that it may also lead to greater financial 
stability. These results imply that legal environment strengthening and 
institutional development are crucial for a well-functioning and stable banking 
system. Our results also suggest that domestic banks benefit more from the 
improvement of institutional environment in terms of risk management. In 
complementing the economic argument that better legal institutional environment 
attracts more foreign capital, our finding implies that strengthening creditor rights 
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Table 4.   DID regression results of Z-score and 
     institutional  reforms 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of Z-score. Main interested independent variables are 
three institutional reforms. In the first three models institutional reform variables are entered 
separately. The last model includes all three reforms together. Due to the high correlations among 
institutional reform variables, we use residual measures and include three reforms together in the 
last model. Control variables include various bank characteristics and country macro factors. In all 
estimations year fixed effect and bank fixed effect are included but not reported. Bootstrapped 
robust clustered standard errors are used to control for unobserved serial correlations. T-statistics 
are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ln_Z ln_Z ln_Z ln_Z 
Reforms indicators            
ln_Legal reform   1.3366**      
 (2.4891)      
ln_Banking reform  2.1957***  
 (2.8204)  
ln_Enterprise reform   5.5268**  
 (2.2841)  
Reform indicators-residual 
measures      
Legal_reform_residual      0.4888*** 
      (3.3799) 
Banking_reform_residual      2.8438*** 
      (3.5473) 
Enterprise_reform_residual      4.2205*** 
      (3.1976) 
Bank characteristics        
ln_asset 0.3921*** 0.4161*** 0.3451** 0.3097** 
 (2.7379) (3.0137) (2.0075) (2.0672) 
ln_Equity_Ratio 0.5476*** 0.6048*** 0.5815*** 0.5247*** 
 (2.7815) (3.7215) (2.8333) (3.0360) 
ln_Loanloss_prov -0.1662*** -0.1352*** -0.1461*** -0.1579*** 
 (-3.8039) (-3.6351) (-4.7770) (-4.7854) 
ln_Deposit_Ratio 0.1059 0.0205 0.1133 0.1003 
 (0.4470) (0.0723) (0.4178) (0.3505) 
ln_Loan_Ratio 0.1142 0.1608 0.1586 0.0623 
 (0.7747) (1.1358) (0.9739) (0.3749) 
Country macro controls       
GDP_per capita 0.0294 0.0519 0.0910** 0.1042** 
 (0.6432) (1.2854) (2.2184) (2.2908) 
Inflation 0.0116 -0.0054 -0.0007 0.0050 
 (0.9721) (-0.5204) (-0.0682) (0.3579) 
Deposit insurance -1.1353*** -0.9088*** -0.9633*** -0.9342*** 
 (-4.2077) (-3.6720) (-3.9063) (-2.8336) 
Bank crisis  -0.0774 0.0289 -0.1684 -0.0502 
 (-0.4607) (0.1804) (-0.8826) (-0.3762) 
Constant -3.0602 -4.3236* -8.1510*** -1.9049 
   (-1.5954) (-1.7198) (-2.7844) (-0.8551) 
Firm fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,261 1,453 1,453 1,261 
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